LAFD’s failure to pre-deploy before Palisades fire: A Times investigation
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In ousting Los Angeles Fire Department Chief Kristin Crowley Friday, Mayor Karen Bass cited failures of pre-deploying firefighters before the Jan. 7 firestorm began.
“We know that 1,000 firefighters that could have been on duty on the morning the fires broke out were instead sent home on Chief Crowley’s watch,” Bass said in a statement.
A series of Times investigations over the last several weeks have exposed deep concerns about whether the Los Angeles Fire Department was prepared for Jan. 7 despite extensive warnings about hurricane strength winds and bone-dry conditions.
Here is what The Times has reported:
A failure to pre-deploy
- Top Los Angeles fire commanders decided not to assign for emergency deployment roughly 1,000 available firefighters and dozens of water-carrying engines in advance of the fire that destroyed much of the Pacific Palisades, interviews and internal LAFD records show.
- Fire officials chose not to order the firefighters to remain on duty for a second shift l as the winds were building — which would have doubled the personnel on hand
Fire officials made the critical decision to forgo calling in scores of extra firefighters and equipment in the hours before the fire, according to internal documents reviewed by The Times.
Missed opportunity
- The LAFD could have sent at least 10 additional engines to Pacific Palisades before the fire — engines that could have been on patrol along the hillsides and canyons, several former top officials for the department told The Times.
- Crews from those engines might have spotted the fire soon after it started, when it was still small enough to give them a chance to control it, the former officials said.
The toll might not have been as bad if extra engines had been pre-positioned much closer to the most fire-prone areas, former fire chiefs said.
2025 vs. 2011
- Facing dire fire conditions in 2011, LAFD positioned at least 40 extra fire engines at stations in areas where the fire hazards were greatest, including the Palisades. The additional rigs included more than 20 pre-deployed to those stations and 18 “ready reserve” engines that supplement the regular firefighting force in such emergencies, the records and interviews show.
- It marks a contrast to the decisions made on Jan. 7.
Thirteen years ago, the LAFD took the type of dramatic measures in preparation of dangerous winds that the department failed to employ last week in advance of the Palisades fire.
The Board of Fire Commissioners president said earlier this month that it will do an “independent audit” of the Palisades fire.
Palisades evacuations
- The Times also investigated the chaotic evacuations of Pacific Palisades on Jan. 7. Streets were gridlocked at least 40 minutes before the first widespread evacuation order. As flames approached, firefighters and police told motorists to get out and run. The abandoned cars worsened the jam and prevented first responders from getting through. Residents trapped by blocked roads said they were forced to shelter in place.
- Decades of warnings that the community’s three major roads were inadequate escape routes for thousands of people living in upper reaches of the Palisades proved prophetic.
A deep analysis of the Palisades fire evacuation paints a chaotic scenario: As the fire roared toward homes, major escape routes were gridlocked before the first evacuation orders were given.
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